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            The obligation of States to not use force against other States is 
well established in international law both on land and at sea. Unless 
authorized by the United Nations Security Council or based on self-
defence, non-compliance with this rule is a breach of international law 
and may give rise to State responsibility for wrongful act. The same 
cannot be argued about States’ behaviour towards non-State actors. 
An example comes from the area of contested waters, where private 
oil companies authorized by one of the disputing States may be 
forcibly evicted or have their personnel detained by the other disputant 
with acts which exceed the limits of law enforcement. International 
law of the sea fails to determine the legality of such behaviour and the 
means by which the affected private actor may respond. But insofar as 
the law does not explicitly oblige States to respect private actors and 
prevents the latter from submitting personal claims to international 
fora, private interests in contested waters will remain unprotected 
against unlawful State acts.  
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1. Introduction 
The obligation of States to not use force against other States is well established in 
international law both on land and at sea.2 Unless authorized by the United Nations Security 
Council or based on self-defence, any use or the threat of force by a State to another violates 
this rule and may give rise to State responsibility for an internationally wrongful act.3  
                                                     
1 Dr Marianthi Pappa is a Teaching Associate at the University of Nottingham, UK. She holds a PhD in 
International Law of the Sea awarded by the University of Aberdeen, UK; an LLM in Oil & Gas Law awarded 
by the University of Aberdeen, UK; and an LLB awarded by Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece. 
Before joining academia, she practiced law in Greece, as litigator, and Cyprus, consulting multinational 
corporations operating in the fields of finance and energy. 
2 Arts 2(4) UN Charter; 301 UNCLOS. 
3 Arts 42 and 51 UN Charter; Art 1 of Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts. 
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 This paper seeks to examine whether the above obligation of States extends vis-a-vis 
non-State actors too. The driving force behind this question has been the situations where a 
State has attacked or threatened the personnel of private oil companies operating in disputed 
maritime areas, as these acts may exceed the limits of law enforcement.4  
An analysis of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 
(UNCLOS)5 and international case law demonstrates that the existing legal framework fails 
to address this matter effectively. Not only is the law of the sea State-centric, for implying 
that the obligation to not use force applies only between States but it also prevents non-State 
actors from triggering the procedural mechanisms of UNCLOS which could be useful for the 
protection of private interests against the unlawful acts of States.  
2. Forcible Acts by States towards Non-State Actors 
2.1. The States’ Right to Law Enforcement 
For centuries, the ocean was considered too immense to be appropriated by nations.6 The only 
part of the seas where State control extended was a 3-nautical mile (M) belt adjacent to the coast, 
known as the Territorial Sea (TS). The possession of this maritime zone was based on the 
customary rule of ‘cannon shot’, which provided that ‘the territorial sovereignty ends where the 
power of arms (cannons) ends.’7   
This picture changed radically in the mid-twentieth century. The occurrence of the two 
World Wars cultivated the notion that States need to resort to the ocean for living and non-living 
                                                     
4 Such events have been reported in the East and South China Seas, in the West Atlantic Ocean and elsewhere.  
For example, in June 2003 a Malaysian patrol boat chased away a Bruneian-contracted survey vessel of Total 
from an area of overlapping claims. M. Hurle, ‘Brunei-Malaysian Foreign Minister to Address Maritime 
Boundary with Brunei,’ IHS Daily Insight, July 7, 2003, cited in John Donaldson, ‘Oil and Water: Assessing the 
Link between Maritime Boundary Delimitation and Hydrocarbon Resources’ in Clive Schofield et al, The Limits 
of Maritime Jurisdiction (Brill, 2014) 138. In 2014, a series of collisions occurred between Vietnamese patrol 
boats and Chinese oil vessels close to the disputed Spratly Islands. Source: South China Morning Post 
<https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1506633/ships-collide-vietnam-tries-stop-china-oil-rig-deployment-
disputed-waters> accessed 14 August 2018. Another example is the threat extended by the Surinamese navy to 
Guyana’s contractor in the contested waters between the two States, analysed below.  
5 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, signed on 10 December 1982, and entered into force on 16 
November 1994, 1833 UNTS 3. 
6 Under the so-called ‘freedom of the high seas.’ This doctrine introduced by Hugo Grotius, in Mare Liberum 
Siue de Jure Quod Batavis Competit ad Indicna Commercia Dissertatio (The Freedom of the Seas or The Right 
which Belongs to the Dutch to Take Part in the East Indian Trade) (1609) (Oxford University Press 1916). 
According to Grotius, the sea is ‘not susceptible of occupation’ because it can ‘neither easily be built upon nor 
enclosed’. 28-31.  
7 This rule has been attributed to Cornelius van Bynkershoek in 1702, and remained valid for next two centuries. 
Wyndham Walker, ‘Territorial Waters: The Cannon Shot Rule’ (1945) 22 British Yearbook of International 
Law 210; 211-213; Lea Brilmayer and Natalie Klein, ‘Land and Sea: Two Sovereignty Regimes in Search of a 
Common Dominator’ (2001) 33 Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series 703; 717.   
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natural resources.8 In the same period, the end of colonization in Latin America, Africa, and 
Asia marked the birth of numerous coastal nations seeking access to the ocean for economic 
development.9 A significant number of littoral States asserted national claims to the waters 
and the subsoil beyond the TS.10 In response to States’ unilateral proclamations, the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958 was the first international treaty to expand 
national jurisdiction in the seabed.11 Yet, the expansion of State control in the ocean was 
completed with UNCLOS. Today, every littoral state is entitled to a 12-nautical mile TS, a 
200-nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and a 200-nautical mile Continental 
Shelf (CS) which in certain circumstances can extend up to 350 nautical miles from the 
coast.12 
The expansion of State jurisdiction in the ocean with the above maritime zones has 
provided coastal States with significant economic, socio-political, and military benefits. 
These include: access to living and non-living natural resources, navigation, and defence of 
external maritime boundaries.13 To secure those interests in the ocean, every coastal State 
possesses the power to adopt its own laws and regulations and enforce them within its TS, 
CS, and EEZ.14 
In general, a State may perform various law enforcement actions in relation to foreign 
persons and vessels that are present in its maritime zones. These include, ‘surveillance, 
stopping and boarding vessels, search or inspection, reporting, arrest or seizure of persons 
                                                     
8 Rene-Jean Dupuy and Daniel Vignes (eds), A Handbook on the New Law of the Sea Vol I (Martinus Nijhoff 
1991) 3-4.   
9 Only between 1943 and 1973 about 70 States achieved independence, 55 of which are coastal. Edward Brown, 
‘Maritime Zones: A Survey of Claims’, in Robin Churchill et al (eds), New Directions in the Law of the Sea Vol 
III (British Institute of International and Comparative Law 1973) 159.   
10 E.g Proclamations of US President Harry Truman with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and 
the Seabed of the Continental Shelf and with Respect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas, 28 
September 1945; Proclamation of Argentina on the Epicontinental Sea, 05 December 1946; Declaration of the 
Maritime Zone of Chile, Ecuador, and Peru (Santiago Declaration), 18 August 1952.   
11 Convention on the Continental Shelf, signed on 29 April 1958, and entered into force on 10 June 1964, 499 
UNTS 311. Arts 1-2.  
12 Arts 3; 57 and 76, respectively. An additional maritime belt established under Art 33(1) UNCLOS is the 
Contiguous Zone, which extends within 24 M from the State’s baselines. This is a buffer zone as it serves the 
State’s controlling rights of preventing and punishing any infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or 
sanitary laws and regulations. This zone is part of the EEZ (when the latter is claimed by the coastal State) or 
the high seas (in the opposite occasion). The TS, CS, EEZ are now parts of customary international law. This 
means that every littoral State is entitled to them, even the States which have not signed UNCLOS. See, 
Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v Norway) (1951) Dissenting Opinion of Judge McNair 48; North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases (Germany/Denmark; Germany/Netherlands) (1969) ICJ Rep 51 [19]; Case Concerning 
the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (1982) ICJ Rep 33 [34]; Case Concerning Delimitation 
of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States) (1984) ICJ Rep 294 [94].  
13 It is estimated that 87% of the world’s known submarine oil deposits fall within States’ CS. Clive Schofield, 
‘Parting the Waves: Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction and the Division of Ocean Space’ (2012) Penn State 
Journal of Law and International Affairs 1(1) 40; 46. Also, 90-95 per cent of the world’s fisheries are now under 
national jurisdiction, pursuant to the EEZ. Syma Ebbin et al, A Sea Change: The Exclusive Economic Zone and 
Governance Institutions for Living Marine Resources (Springer 2005) xi.   
14 Natalie Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea (Oxford University Press 2011) 63.  
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and vessels, detention, and formal application of law judicial or other process, including 
imposition of sanctions.’15 This power may even extend to waters beyond the coastal States’ 
jurisdiction. Under the so-called right of ‘hot pursuit’, coastal authorities may keep pursuing 
in the high seas a foreign vessel that is believed to have violated their State’s domestic laws.16 
2.2 Limitations 
The right of law enforcement appertains to every coastal State for its entitled maritime zones. 
As such, it is not affected by the lack of clear maritime boundaries or by the existence of a 
boundary dispute with its neighbour(s). Notwithstanding, the aforesaid power cannot be 
excessive. Rather, it is subject to limitations of international law. The very purpose of those 
limitations is to secure a balance between the specific interests of coastal States and the 
general freedom of navigation in the ocean.17 That way, international law seeks to preserve 
the peaceful order of the seas against aggressive State behaviours that may evolve into violent 
conflicts.  
If those limitations are disrespected by a coastal State, the conduct in question may 
not be a case of lawful enforcement (as the acting State would contend) but a prohibited act 
of force under international law.18 The unjustified or excessive use or threat of force by a 
coastal State in the context of law enforcement may qualify as unlawful military action, even 
if it does not contravene the performing State’s internal laws. Consequently, the author of 
such action may incur responsibility for an internationally wrongful act.19 
Unfortunately, the criteria as to what qualifies as lawful enforcement and what as 
unlawful use of force are not articulated in a fixed set of rules. Rather, they emerge from 
interpretation of the States’ general obligation under international law to abstain from the use 
of force or the threat thereof in light of the facts of each case. This makes the distinction 
between law enforcement and use of force extremely difficult and even controversial at times. 
But despite the above hurdle, international jurisprudence has managed to affirm the existence 
of State responsibility for the use of force in the ocean in various cases, including situations 
of contested waters. 
                                                     
15 William Burke, The New International Law of Fisheries: UNCLOS 1982 and Beyond (Clarendon Press 1994) 
303; Klein, (ibid). See also Arts 27; 73; 105; 110; 220; 224-227 UNCLOS.  
16 Art 111 UNCLOS, as exception to the rule that vessels on the high seas are subject to no other authority than 
their flag State, affirmed in SS Lotus case (France v Turkey) (1927) PCIJ Series A No 10, 25. This exceptional 
right exists insofar as the pursuit has commenced in any of the State’s maritime zones and ceases as soon as the 
foreign vessel enters the Territorial Sea of its own State or of a third State. Art 111 (1-3).  
17 Klein (n14) 62. 
18 Art 2(4) UN Charter; Art 301 UNCLOS.  
19 Under Art 1 of Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts. 
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In the famous Guyana/Suriname boundary dispute, the Surinamese navy ordered a 
Canadian oil rig which was operating on behalf of Guyana in disputed waters to abandon the 
area for interfering with the exploratory rights of Suriname.20 In response to the verbal 
warning ‘the consequences will be yours’, the rig withdrew from the concession area, fearful 
that the Surinamese navy would resort to force.21  
The hearing tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)22 affirmed that 
‘force may be used in law enforcement activities provided that such force is unavoidable, 
reasonable and necessary.’23 But although no weapons were used and no injuries occurred in 
this case, the tribunal held that the Surinamese navy’s warning was not an act of law 
enforcement but a threat of military action equal to the prohibited threat of force under 
international law.24 As a result, Suriname was pronounced responsible for conducting an 
internationally wrongful act.25 
In the M/V Saiga (No 2) case, Guinea, in its attempt to stop an unarmed oil tanker that 
had reportedly entered its EEZ, fired the ship indiscriminately with solid shots from large-
calibre automatic guns, causing considerable damage to the vessel and severe injuries to two 
persons on board.26  
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) affirmed that force against 
vessels is permitted in the context of law enforcement only as last resort and never beyond 
what is considered as reasonable and necessary under the circumstances.27 Unless these 
conditions are met, a coastal State must proceed with lesser actions, such as the sending of 
internationally-recognized stopping signals and firing of shots only across the bows of the 
ship. Only after a failure of those attempts may the State resort to force. And even then, 
appropriate warning must be given to the vessel and all efforts must be made to ensure that 
life is not endangered.28 In this light, Guinea was found responsible for failing to comply with 
the above standards of conduct.  
                                                     
20 Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname (Guyana/Suriname) Award (PCA 2007) ICGJ [151]; [433]. 
21 ibid [151]. 
22 Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Pursuant to Article 287, and in Accordance with Annex VII of UNCLOS. 
23 Guyana/Suriname (n20) [445], citing S.S ‘’I’m Alone’’ (Canada/United States) RIAA Vol 3, 1615; Red 
Crusader (Commission of Enquiry, Denmark-United Kingdom), 35 ILR 199; M/V Saiga (No 2) (Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines v Guinea), Judgment ITLOS Rep 1999, 7.  
24 Guyana/Suriname (n20) [445]; [488]. 
25 According to the judges, Suriname had breached collectively its obligations under Arts: 2(4) UN Charter; 301 
UNCLOS; 74(3) and 83(3) UNCLOS. Award (n20) [452]. Also see, Patricia Jimenez Kwast, ‘Maritime Law 
Enforcement and the Use of Force: Reflections on the Categorisation of Forcible Action at Sea in the Light of 
the Guyana/Suriname Award’ (2008) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 13(1) 49; 50-52; 69-72. 
26 Saiga No 2 (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea), Judgment ITLOS (1990) Rep 10 [153]; [157-158]. 
27 ibid [155-156]. 
28 ibid, citing I’m Alone (n23) 1609; and Red Crusader (n23) 485. 
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An interesting situation involving forcible actions conducted by both States arose in 
the Oil Platforms case.29 In this dispute, the USA presented their attack to several Iranian oil 
platforms as an act of self-defence against a previous attack by Iran on American-flagged 
merchant vessels and warships.30 In a remarkable attempt to limit aggressive behaviours in 
the ocean, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) criticized both States’ actions. On the one 
hand, it held that the US response was neither necessary nor proportionate to Iran’s previous 
attack, and as such, it could not be justified as self-protection of the defendant’s interests.31 
At the same time, the Court’s stance towards Iran affirmed that a forcible action against 
private merchant vessels can also qualify as unlawful use of force.32  
2.3 Implications for Non-State Actors 
So far, in all cases which involve unlawful State actions in the ocean (including actions 
addressed to vessels, platforms, and persons) the performing State has been pronounced 
responsible for breaching its international obligation to not use force towards another State.33 
However, it cannot be overlooked that a forcible action against a non-State actor will affect 
that entity itself by causing serious damages of financial/commercial nature or even by 
threatening the life of persons.  
Regrettably, international judges have never gone that far to explain whether the 
State’s obligation to not use force exists strictly vis-à-vis States or extends towards non-State 
actors too. And if it does extend towards non-State actors, it remains to be ascertained 
whether an attacked/threatened physical or juridical person has the capacity to invoke the 
rules of State responsibility before an international court or tribunal. The below paragraphs 
will address those issues in sequence.  
2.4. Prohibition of the Use of Force in International Law  
Art 2(4) of the UN Charter provides that,  
               ‘All Members (of the United Nations) shall refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of 
the United Nations.’34 
                                                     
29 Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America, 2003 ICJ Rep, 161. Although this case does not involve 
disputed waters.  
30 ibid [25-26]. 
31 ibid [74-78], citing Legality of the Threat or Use of Force of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion 1996, ICJ 
Rep 245 [41]; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America) 1986, ICJ Rep, 94 [176].  
32 [120]. Kwast (n25) 59; 85.  
33 E.g Guyana/Suriname (n20) [423-424]; Saiga No 2 (n26) [159]. 
34 Art 2(4) UN Charter. 
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The above obligation is repeated almost verbatim in Art 301 UNCLOS (under the title 
‘Peaceful Uses of the Ocean’) according to which, 
             ‘In exercising their rights and performing their duties 
under this Convention, States Parties shall refrain from any 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter 
of the United Nations’.35 
The above provisions demonstrate that the threat or use of force is prohibited both on land 
and at sea. In essence, both articles crystallize a pre-existing customary rule which prohibits 
aggressiveness and coercion for the maintenance of world peace and security.36 
Both articles prohibit the use or threat of force against ‘the territorial integrity or 
political independence’ of other States. Two important observations emerge from this 
wording. First, that the prohibition of force applies to interstate relations rather than to States’ 
internal affairs, including non-State actors.37 Second, the explicit reference to ‘Member 
States’ and ‘States Parties’ implies that the obligation to not use force binds only the 
signatories of the UN Charter and UNCLOS. This would further mean that the prohibition of 
the use of force applies solely among States, not between States and non-State entities. The 
following paragraphs will challenge those assumptions.  
2.4.1 The Bearers of the Obligation  
It is reminded that both the UN Charter and UNCLOS are instruments of quasi-universal 
applicability. The former has been adopted by almost every State, while the latter has been 
ratified by 168 States.38 But even if that was not the case, the obligation to not use force is an 
exception to the general rule according to which a treaty binds only its parties (pacta tertiis 
nec nocent prosunt).39 That is explicitly stipulated in Art 2(6) of the UN Charter, which 
provides that even the non-members of the United Nations are obliged to act in accordance 
with the Principles of the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.40 
This means that no States are absolved of the obligation to not use force, even those which 
are not members of the United Nations (e.g Palestine).  
                                                     
35 Art 301 UNCLOS. 
36 Nicaragua v United States of America (n31) [174-194]. For a historic analysis of this customary rule see, 
Kamrul Hossain, ‘The Concept of Jus Cogens and the Obligation Under the UN Charter’ (2005) Santa Clara 
Journal of International Law 3(1) 72; 90-92.  
37 Albrecht Randelzhofer, ‘Article 2(4)’, in Bruno Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary (Oxford University Press 1995) 121. 
38 Source, the United Nations <www.un.org>;            
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm> both accessed 10 
December 2016.  
39 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (3rd ed, Oxford University Press 1979) 691. 
40 Art 2(6) UN Charter.  
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Besides, according to the ICJ and the International Law Commission (ILC), the 
prohibition on the use of force ‘constitutes a conspicuous example’ of a jus cogens 
(peremptory) norm.41 The latter is defined as  
                  A norm accepted and recognized by the international 
community of States as a whole, as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character.42 
A peremptory norm is of ‘constitutional’ or ‘super-customary’ character, for it possesses a 
superior position among the rest rules of international law.43 Any derogation from such rule is 
ipso facto void, unless it is based on another peremptory norm. This means that States cannot 
rule out their obligation to not use force by treaty or consent.44 
As regards to their effect, it is accepted that jus cogens norms are valid erga omnes 
(towards everyone).45 That is why in the famous Barcelona Traction case, the ICJ held that 
the prohibition of aggression (as well as the prohibition of genocide, slavery, and racial 
discrimination) concerns ‘the international community as a whole’, and as such, it must be 
observed by all States.46  
A brief note must be hereby made. The above position presumes that a forcible attack 
emanates only from a State. Today, however, it is increasingly accepted that armed attacks 
may also be addressed to States by non-State actors (e.g terrorist groups, individuals) whose 
acts are not controlled or ordered by a State. This allows an attacked State to take forcible 
actions of self-defence against the performing non-State entity, just like it would do against 
an attacking State.47 This demonstrates that the conduct of coercion is not necessarily a State 
                                                     
41 Nicaragua v USA (n31) [190] and Separate Opinion of Judge Sette-Camara 199; ILC Commentary to Art 50 
of its Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, ILC Yearbook, 1966-II, 247. cf James Green, ‘Questioning the 
Peremptory Status of the Prohibition of the Use of Force’ (2011) Michigan Journal of International Law 32(2) 
215-257. 
42 Art 53, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Other recognized examples of jus cogens are the 
prohibition of genocide, slavery, and racial discrimination.  
43 Hossain (n36) 73-74; David Kennedy, International Legal Structures (Nomos 1987) 26-27. 
44 According to Arts 53 and 64 Vienna Convention, and Arts 20 and 26 Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts. Also see, Sondre Torp Helmersen, ‘The Prohibition of the Use of Force as 
Jus Cogens: Explaining Apparent Derogations’ (2014) Netherlands International Law Review, LXI, 167; 170-
171. 
45 ILC Report on the Work of its Twenty-Eighth Session 3 May-23 July 1976, ILC Yearbook 1976-II, 102; 
Jonathan Charney, ‘Third State Remedies in International Law’, in Rene Provost (ed), State Responsibility in 
International Law (Ashgate 2002) 213. 
46 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited Judgment (Belgium v Spain) (1970) ICJ Rep 3 [33-
34]. The same approach was followed in East Timor (Portugal v Australia) (1995) ICJ Rep 90 [29]; Nuclear 
Weapons (n31) [83]; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Preliminary Objections (1996) ICJ Rep 595 [31-32]. 
47 Under Art 51 UN Charter. See US military operations against Al-Qaeda and Taleban forces. Also see, 
Michael Byers, ‘Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law After 11 September’ (2002) 51 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 401; 407-409; Green (n41) 237-238; Klein (n14) 268. 
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attribute. Of course, that is not to say that a non-State actor which is conducting a coercive 
act will be responsible for breaching the international obligation to not use force under 
Article 2(4) UN Charter or Article 301 UNCLOS as this obligation is exclusively imposed on 
States.48  
2.4.2 The Beneficiaries of the Obligation 
Things are much vaguer when it comes to the beneficiaries of the States’ obligation to not use 
force. As seen earlier, the Barcelona Traction judgment affirmed that an erga omnes 
obligation exists between a State and the international community as a whole. Absent 
necessity, the ICJ omitted to determine the content of this phrase. Hence, while the hearing 
panel explained that the prohibition of aggression burdens every State, it remained silent as to 
whom this obligation is actually owed to, would it be another sovereign State or a non-state 
actor.  
So far, the position of jurisprudence with regards to the obligation to not use force 
supports that the latter is owed by States towards other States. That is affirmed in all cases 
which have accepted that an attack/threat against vessels, platforms or persons is essentially a 
use of force against their flag or authorizing State.49 This implies that international 
community comprises only States.  
 However, a more progressive approach has been expressed by the ILC, according to 
which an erga omnes obligation is owed to the international community at large. As 
explained, the international community ‘is no longer limited to States (if it ever was)’ but 
comprises a cluster of non-State entities, such as individuals, organizations, and multinational 
corporations.50 Although States possess a central place in international law, ‘there are other 
persons or entities (...) to whom obligations may exist and who may invoke responsibility for 
breaches of those obligations.’51  
Clearly, this position corresponds to the changing structure of the international 
community. Thus, while drafting Article 33 on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, the ILC purposefully rejected the term ‘international community of States as 
a whole’ (which is found in various international law instruments) in favour of the more 
                                                     
48 This would only be the case if that entity has acted on behalf of a State. Also, it is a different issue whether a 
non-State entity (e.g terrorist group) can be prosecuted to the International Criminal Court for conducting an 
international crime (e.g a crime against humanity, under Art 7 of the Rome Statute).  
49 E.g Saiga No. 2; Oil Platforms case; Guyana/Suriname. 
50 James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text 
and Commentaries (Cambridge University Press 2002) 41. 
51 ibid. 
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inclusive phrase ‘international community as a whole’ (a phrase previously employed by the 
ICJ in Barcelona Traction).52 As paragraph 1 of this provision reads:  
                 ‘The obligations of the responsible State (...) may be 
owed to another State, to several States, or to the international 
community as a whole (...).’53 
By choosing this wording, the ILC intended to secure not only the interests of individual 
States from wrongful acts, but also the interests of international community lato sensu.  
Based on this progressive approach, the threat or use of force against a non-State 
entity concerns that entity per se, not its home-State. That is radically different from the 
judges’ current stance, according to which a forcible action against the nationals or the ships 
of a foreign State is necessarily an attack to the State itself. Despite its departure from the 
judges’ position, the ILC’s approach appears to be more convincing for two main reasons. 
First, as jus cogens, the obligation of States to not use force creates a stricter regime 
of State responsibility than that occurring from any other wrongful act.54 Second, the 
prohibition of force bears a special (legal and moral) value, which is the preservation of 
international peace and stability. Since the latter concerns the international community as a 
whole, it must be accepted that the obligation of States to not use force is owed equally to 
States and non-State actors. It remains to be discovered whether international jurisprudence 
will adopt this position in the future, although that seems extremely doubtful.  
Apart from the ILC’s reasoning, there are also other grounds to support this 
progressive approach. As mentioned earlier, it is now accepted that non-State actors can also 
be the authors of coercive acts, just like States. It is only in that case that a State can attack a 
non-State entity by invoking the right of self-defence.55 In any other situation, the State’s 
forcible action will be an unlawful use of force.56 If anything, this affirms that non-State 
actors are (also) true beneficiaries of the States’ obligation to not use force. Their right is 
active until they attack a State. 
Finally, it must be reminded that unarmed persons and neutral merchant vessels are 
exempted from attack in times of interstate armed conflicts.57 The so-called ‘laws of 
neutrality’ seek to protect non-participants in international conflicts from the acts of 
                                                     
52 ibid 40.  
53 Art 33(1) Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. 
54 Crawford (n50) 127. 
55 Perhaps a State might also receive authorization by the UN Security Council to respond to such attack, under 
Art 42 UN Charter. 
56 See Oil Platforms case (n29) [74-78]. 
57 Klein (n14) 289; Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict 
(Cambridge University Press 2004) 102-103. 
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belligerents and preserve the peaceful use of the oceans.58 But if States are obliged to apply 
peaceful measures against non-State actors in times of war, there is no convincing reason 
why they should not do the same during peacetime, even in the context of a boundary dispute.  
In sum, it is not yet established in international law whether the States’ obligation to 
not use force extends towards non-State entities in the ocean. The traditional position in 
international jurisprudence, that an attack against vessels, platforms, and persons is an 
unlawful use of force towards the flag or authorizing State of those entities, supports a 
negative answer. But as a more progressive approach suggests, that is at least plausible.  
2.4.3 Invocation of Breach of the Obligation to Not Use Force 
The next step is to examine who can submit a claim against a State that has forcefully 
attacked a non-State actor in the ocean before an international court or tribunal. Under Part 
XV UNCLOS, a procedure concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS can be 
initiated by the parties of this treaty, viz. States.59  
 In this light, a claim against the performing State with regards to breach of Art 301 
UNCLOS can only be submitted by another State. On the contrary, no such claim can be 
brought to an international forum by the attacked/threatened non-State entity.  
In Guyana/Suriname, for example, the forcible threat of Suriname against Guyana’s 
licensee was invoked by Guyana.60 However, an important note must be hereby made. The 
aforesaid claim was a personal claim of Guyana, not its licensee’s. Since the incident 
occurred in contested waters, Guyana invoked the States’ international obligation to settle 
their disputes peacefully. Thus, it successfully asserted that the threat of force against the 
operator was in fact a failure of Suriname to settle its boundary dispute with Guyana in a 
peaceful way.61  
On the contrary, no mention was made to the private actor’s interests. Following the 
Surinamese threat, the oil company abandoned the explored area. Undoubtedly, the sudden 
disruption of activities may cause a commercial and economic damage to the operator. 
However, the only damage brought to the tribunal’s attention was Guyana’s harm occurring 
from the breach of Suriname’s obligation to settle the boundary dispute peacefully.62 In turn, 
                                                     
58 Insofar as these entities make no effective contribution to interstate attacks. Klein (n14) 290.  
59 Arts 279; 286; 291 (1). 
60 Guyana/Suriname (n20) [401]. 
61 ibid [402]. 
62 Guyana/Suriname (n20) [401]. 
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Guyana claimed compensation for its own damage not its licensee’s.63 To that extent, the 
non-State actor remained unprotected.  
Conversely, it remains uncertain whether Guyana’s claim would still be successful if 
it was not invoked in the context of the interstate boundary dispute (e.g if it concerned the 
States’ obligation to not use force towards non-State actors). Given the existing stance of 
jurisprudence, that seems highly unlikely.  
A final question is whether Canada (the home State of the attacked company) could 
also submit an international claim against Suriname under the rules of diplomatic protection. 
The legal challenges associated with this option are discussed below in section 4. What is 
important at this point, is that a claim submitted directly by the concerned non-State entity 
would be inadmissible under UNCLOS.  
One might suggest that the attacked/threatened actor resort to the ILC’s Draft Articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.64 As stipulated in UNCLOS, 
the provisions of the Convention regarding responsibility for its breach are without prejudice 
to the application of any relevant rules existing in international law.65 The invocation of such 
existing rules by the physical or juridical person in question could perhaps cover for the lack 
of that person’s procedural capacity under UNCLOS. However, this does not seem to be the 
case. 
According to the Draft Articles, only two types of entities can invoke State 
responsibility. The first comprises States which are injured by the wrongful act.66 The second 
category comprises States other than the injured. These may invoke State responsibility for 
the breach of an obligation that is owed to a group of States or to the international community 
as a whole.67 Hence, a non-injured State may claim cessation of the wrongful act and 
reparation of an injured State or of the beneficiary of the obligation breached.68 
In light of the above, the responsibility of an attacking State for the use of force may 
be invoked by the injured State in its own interest69 or by another State on behalf of a 
member of the international community.70 On the face of it, this mechanism seems to allow 
for the protection of non-State entities from the wrongful acts of States, such as the use of 
                                                     
63 Although that claim was eventually dismissed by the tribunal in favour of a declaratory relief [452]. 
64 Arts 30-31 Draft Articles.  
65 Art 304 UNCLOS. 
66 Art 42 Draft Articles. 
67 Art 48(1) (a) and (b) Draft Articles respectively.  
68 Art 48(2) Draft Articles. 
69 E.g Guyana in Guyana/Suriname; St. Vincent and the Grenadines in Saiga 2. 
70 That has not yet occurred by the time of this writing. 
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force. But once again, the very right of invocation of this mechanism lies exclusively with 
States.  
It is regrettable that while the ILC accepts that the international community comprises 
actors other than States, it hesitates (at least for the moment) to furnish them with the 
procedural capacity to actively protect their interests.71 Of course, the Commission’s stance is 
not entirely unjustifiable. As the learnt Professor and Special Rapporteur of the ILC, James 
Crawford, explains, when a State’s obligation is owed to a non-State entity, a procedure 
usually exists in primary law allowing that entity to invoke State responsibility on its own 
account and without the involvement of any State.72 To that extent, a resort of the non-State 
actor to the Draft Articles would be unnecessary. This indeed applies to other areas, such as 
international human rights and investment law, which allow non-State actors to bring 
personal claims against States before international courts or tribunals. But as seen above, that 
is not the case in international law of the sea. This legislative lacuna deprives non-State actors 
of the right to invoke State responsibility for an evidently unlawful action in the ocean. 
3. Other Unlawful Situations: Detention of Foreign 
Vessels and Crews  
It is also possible that a State arrests a foreign vessel and/or its crew situated in contested 
waters for believing that the vessel has encroached on the State’s national jurisdiction. In 
principle, this could be based on Art 73(1) UNCLOS, which allows coastal States to secure 
their ‘sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resources’ in their 
EEZ. Thus, unless excessive or unnecessary force is used (e.g fire shoots, threats), such arrest 
might fall within the limits of law enforcement.  
But as 73(2) UNCLOS adds, a detained vessel/crew must be promptly released upon 
the posting of a bond or other security. In that case, although refusal of release is distinct 
from the previously examined forcible acts (in the sense that it does not cause breach of Arts 
2.4 of the UN Charter or 301 UNCLOS) it is clearly unlawful. The non-compliant State shall 
be forced by an international court or tribunal to release the vessel/crew and may further 
incur responsibility for an internationally wrongful act.73 However, two important questions 
                                                     
71 For a critical analysis see, Edith Brown Weiss, ‘Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century’ 
(2002) 96 American Journal of International Law 798-816. Also see James Crawford, ‘The ILC’s Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: A Retrospect’ (2002) 96 The American Journal of 
International Law 874; 886-888. 
72 Crawford (n50) 209-210. 
73 Art 292(1) UNCLOS; Art 1 Draft Arts. To this day, eighteen cases concerning arrested vessels/crews have 
been submitted to ITLOS, nine of which requesting prompt release under Art 292. 
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arise. The first is who can invoke the right of prompt release. The second is whether this right 
concerns only fishing vessels or extends to any vessels present in the arresting State’s entitled 
EEZ (e.g vessels conducting petroleum operations).  
As regards to the first question, Art 292(2) UNCLOS is straightforward by stating that 
‘the application for release may be made only by or on behalf of the flag State of the vessel.’ 
The nationality of crew members is totally irrelevant and so is their need to submit claims in 
person.74 Interestingly, the 1973 proposal on the aforesaid provision originally allowed the 
owner or the operator of the arrested vessel to submit a request for prompt release to 
ITLOS.75 But eventually, the drafters of UNCLOS decided to block individuals from 
initiating this judicial proceeding, in order to reconcile the interest of the flag State with the 
interest of the detaining State.76 That is at least regrettable, considering that the procedure of 
prompt release concerns directly private, not State interests.  
The second issue, which is far more complex, was addressed by international 
jurisprudence in Saiga (No 1).77 The case concerned an oil tanker (named Saiga) flying the 
flag of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, supplying fuel oil to fishing vessels operating off 
the coast of Guinea. When the tanker reportedly entered Guinea’s EEZ, it got arrested by the 
State’s Customs patrol boats.78  
The flag State claimed that Guinea had breached Art 73(2) UNCLOS and requested 
the judicial release of the detained vessel and crew under Art 292(1). Guinea, on the other 
hand, supported that the aforesaid provisions are irrelevant, as Saiga was not arrested for 
conducting fishing operations but for smuggling.79  
The hearing tribunal of ITLOS had to choose between a broad interpretation of Art 
292(1) UNCLOS, which would allow the mechanism of prompt release to apply in all cases 
of detention (irrespective of the nature of the vessel’s operations and the legality of its arrest), 
or dismissal of the case as ill-founded.  
Interestingly, the tribunal rejected both options. Both the text and the travaux 
préparatoires of Art 292(1) UNCLOS suggest that the mechanism of prompt release is of 
restrictive nature, preventing a broad interpretation.80 But at the same time, the judges were 
                                                     
74 A ship with every person or thing on it is considered as a unit that is under the jurisdiction and control of its 
flag State. Art 94 UNCLOS. 
75 Myron Nordquist et al (eds), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, 
(Virginia Commentary (Martinus Nijhoff 1985) Vol V, 67. 
76 Monte Confurco (Seychelles v France), Judgment, ITLOS Rep 2000 [71]. 
77 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea, Judgment, ITLOS Rep 1997. 
78 ibid [26-30]. 
79 ibid. 
80 See Dissenting Opinion of Judges: Park, Nelson, Rao, Vukas and Ndiaye.  
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under the pressure to provide a timely solution. A dismissal of the case could put the practical 
value of Art 292(1) UNCLOS into question. This would further mean that the flag State 
should initiate a new judicial proceeding under Part XV UNCLOS, whereby the prompt 
release of the vessel/crew would be requested incidentally as a provisional measure and after 
the exhaustion of local remedies.81 Not only would this be time consuming, but the defendant 
State could even exclude the case from compulsory judicial settlement under Art 297(3)(a) 
UNCLOS. 
To tackle these jurisprudential challenges, the tribunal held that the refuelling of 
fishing vessels is ancillary to fishing, and therefore, it falls within the scope of Art 292(1) 
UNCLOS.82 To reach this decision, the tribunal made an argumentative leap: it referred to the 
Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific,83 and also 
affirmed that bunkering is related to fishing under Guinea’s law, although none of these 
grounds were invoked by Guinea in the first place.84 Eventually, the tribunal’s 
interpretational manoeuvre  allowed for the prompt release of Saiga and its crew. But it was 
also criticized by the nine dissenting judges and by scholars for interfering with Guinea’s 
pleading.85 
Two important findings emerge from this case. First, unless the arrested vessel relates 
to fishing activities (even indirectly), the procedural mechanism of prompt release provided 
in Art 292(1) UNCLOS appears inapplicable. Thus, if a vessel conducting petroleum 
operations is arrested, it can only be released under the procedures of Part XV UNCLOS. 
Second, although designed to protect the interests of non-State entities, both procedural 
mechanisms (of prompt release and of provisional measures) can only be triggered by States.  
4. Synthesis  
International jurisprudence has made a great step by accepting that when unnecessary or 
excessive force is used by a State, an attack or threat against a non-State actor in the ocean is 
unlawful under the rules of international law. Be that as it may, the act in question is only 
wrongful towards that actor’s flag or authorizing State. Only the latter can bring a claim 
                                                     
81 Arts 286-287; 290; 295. See ARA Libertad (Argentina v Ghana); Arctic Sunrise (the Netherlands v Russian 
Federation). 
82 Judgment (n77) [63-64]. 
83 Signed on 29 November 1989, and entered into force on 17 May 1991. 29 ILM 1449. Art 1. 
84 Judgment (n77) 64. 
85 Dissenting Opinions of Vice-President Wolfrum and Judges Yamamoto and Anderson. Also see Florian 
Wegelein, ‘The Rules of the Tribunal in the Light of Prompt Release of Vessels’ (1999) 30 Ocean Development 
& International Law 255; 276-277. 
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against the performing State to an international court or tribunal. Yet, by doing so, the State 
acts in its own interest, not on the account of the concerned non-state actor.  
Equally, jurisprudence has made an impressive (though controversial) manoeuvre by 
demonstrating that the mechanism for the prompt release of detained vessels/crews is of true 
practical value. However, this attempt cannot in itself cover for the non-State actors’ 
incapacity to trigger the release mechanism in person. 
 In both situations, one can only blame UNCLOS for reserving the capacity to make 
international claims exclusively for States. If anything, this echoes the classic Vattelian 
approach, whereby the mistreatment of a foreign State’s nationals is a mistreatment of that 
State.86 Today, however, this stance is rather dated.  
Arguably, a licence holder may be regarded as an agent of the authorizing State, 
acting under the latter’s powers. Likewise, a ship as a unit operates under the jurisdiction and 
control of its flag State. The actions of those entities are ordered and controlled by States. To 
that extent, the non-State actors in question represent the interests of their flag/authorizing 
States.  
But at the same time, those physical and juridical persons possess some interests of 
their own (e.g life, property, profit-making). These individual interests are so important that 
they are protected directly under various international law disciplines (e.g human rights law, 
investment law). Sadly, the same cannot be argued about international law of the sea. The 
existing procedures in UNCLOS responding to States’ unlawful acts may ultimately leave an 
attacked/threatened non-State actor unprotected.87 At best, an arrested person may secure its 
interests indirectly, should its controlling State trigger certain mechanisms which are 
provided by the Convention. But although useful, those mechanisms can be extremely time-
consuming or even ineffective if the defendant State decides to opt out from the means of 
compulsory judicial settlement.  
To seek protection against the unlawful acts of States, private operators should resort 
to those States’ domestic courts. In that case, their judicial protection will depend solely on 
the place that international law possesses in the legal system of the defendant State. In some 
legal systems, international law possesses a superior standing than domestic law.88 In others, 
                                                     
86 Emmerich de Vattel, Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law, Applied to the Conduct and to the 
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Washington 1916) Book II, Ch VI [71]. 
87 Part XV UNCLOS; Art 292 UNCLOS.  
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Manchester University Press 1999) 447-448; Malgosia Fitmaurice and Cees Flinterman (eds), Interaction 
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however, domestic laws prevail.89 In those jurisdictions, an international doctrine may be 
rendered ineffective if it contradicts domestic legislation.90 Besides, it is more likely that 
municipal courts would favour their government rather than a foreign person.  
To avoid these challenges, the petroleum permit-holder must seek protection to an 
international body. But unless its claim is based on an investment or human rights treaty, the 
private actor can only hope for indirect or diplomatic protection by its home State,91 whatever 
difficulties that entails. In general, a State may request diplomatic protection only for its 
nationals. But although this link is easily traced for physical persons, it is extremely loose for 
multinational corporations which operate or possess assets in countries other than their place 
of incorporation. Besides, a State is not obliged to request diplomatic protection for its 
nationals. This right rests solely on State discretion and is subject to the previous exhaustion 
of local remedies.92 More importantly, the very mechanism of diplomatic protection is 
designed to protect the claimant State’s own rights from the injury caused by the foreign 
State’s actions.93 Hence, even if a claim for diplomatic protection is eventually successful, 
compensation will be awarded to the claimant State, not to its nationals.  
5. Conclusion  
International law prohibits States from resorting to forcible behaviours towards other States. 
This study has sought to determine whether the above obligation extends to the relations of 
States with non-State actors too. The reference point for this discussion has been the 
occasions where a State has treated private oil companies operating in contested waters with 
hostile acts which exceed the limits of lawful enforcement.  
UNCLOS and international case law support that such State behaviour is indeed 
unlawful and may give rise to responsibility under international law, along with a duty of 
compensation. However, the recipient of this right is not the physical or juridical person that 
has been actually attacked, threatened, or arrested but its flag or authorizing State. On the 
face of it, this situation seems to be justified. International law of the sea is a law made by 
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90 For example, in the UK the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty may prevail over international conventions 
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States for States. It stipulates the rights and obligations of States and regulates the behaviour 
of those actors towards each other. This includes the duty of mutual respect between States in 
the context of their maritime affairs.   
But the times when States were the sole protagonists at sea are no bygone. Today, an 
increasing number of individuals and multinational corporations operate in the ocean, 
especially in maritime spaces claimed by two neighbouring States. Still, absent a 
conventional obligation of States to respect private rights situated in contested waters, and 
without the procedural capacity of non-State actors to appear before international courts, 
private interests are exposed to States’ unlawful acts.  
To protect their interests in person against a State’s unlawful behaviour in the ocean, 
non-State actors must either resort to that State’s domestic rules or rely on human rights or 
investment law provisions, whatever the challenges or legal hardships that entails. On the 
contrary, things would be much better for private interests if the obligation of States to not 
use force extended explicitly viz-a-viz non-State actors, and if UNCLOS allowed the attacked 
or arrested persons to submit their own claims to an international forum, such as ITLOS. 
Unfortunately, the State-centrism of UNCLOS can only be criticized as impracticable and 
outdated.  
The increasing presence of private oil companies in contested waters suggests that the 
problem will concern legal theory and practice in the future. By referring to this important 
legal issue, the study hopes to have informed the ongoing discussion in legal theory about the 
place of non-State actors in the international plane, and to encourage future developments 
which would address the inadequacies of international law of the sea.   
 
 
